INTRODUCTION
THAT STRATEGIC RIVALRY in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. Repeated play allows players to respond to each other's actions, and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. The fear of retaliation may thus lead to outcomes that otherwise would not occur. The most dramatic expression of this phenomenon is the celebrated "Folk Theorem" for repeated games. An outcome that Pareto dominates the minimax point is called individually rational. The Folk Theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting. As Aumann and Shapley [3] and Rubinstein [20] have shown, the same result is true when we replace the word "Nash" by "(subgame) perfect" and assume no discounting at all.
Because the Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein result supposes literally no discounting, one may wonder whether the exact counterpart of the Folk Theorem holds for perfect equilibrium, i.e., whether as the discount factor tends to one, the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes converges to the individually rational set. After all, agents in most games of economic interest are not completely patient; the no discounting case is of interest as an approximation.
It turns out that this counterpart is false. There can be a discontinuity (formally, a failure of lower hemicontinuity) where the discount factor, 8, equals one, as we show in Example 3. Nonetheless the games in which discontinuities occur are quite degenerate, and, in the end, we can give a qualified "yes" (Theorem 2) to the question of whether the Folk Theorem holds with discounting. In particular, it always holds in two-player games (Theorem 1). This last result contrasts with the recent work of Radner-Myerson-Maskin [18] showing that, even in two-player games, the equilibrium set may not be continuous at 8 = 1 in information" in the prisoner's dilemma precludes applying the backwards-induction argument that establishes that the players must confess each period. Players can credibly threaten to take suboptimal actions if there is some (small) probability that the action is indeed optimal, because they have an interest in maintaining their reputation for possible "irrationality. " The examples of reputation games analyzed to date exhibit the apparent advantage, compared with infinite-horizon models, of having substantially smaller sets of equilibria. However, the equilibrium set depends on the precise form of irrationality specified. Our "incomplete information" Folk Theorem shows that by varying the kind of irrationality specified, but still keeping the probability of irrationality arbitrarily small, one can trace out the entire set of infinite-horizon equilibria. Thus, in a formal sense, the two approaches, infinite and finite horizon, yield the same results. However, those who are willing to choose among different forms of irrationality may still find the incomplete information approach useful. One may argue for or against certain equilibria on the basis of the type of irrationality needed to support them.
We provide two different theorems for repeated games of incomplete information. Our first result (Theorem 3) parallels Friedman's work on repeated games with discounting: after a deviation the "crazy" player switches to a Nashequilibrium strategy of the constituent game. This simple form of irrationality suffices to support any outcome that Pareto-dominates a,(one-shot) Nash equilibrium. Our second, and main, result (Theorem 4) uses a more complex form of irrationality. However, the basic approach is the same as in our Folk Theorem with discounting: after a deviation each player switches to his minimax strategy for a specified number of periods.
It is not surprising that similar kinds of arguments should apply to both infinite horizon games with discounting and finite horizon games. Each type of game entails the difficulty, not present in infinite horizon games without discounting, that deviators from the equilibrium path cannot be "punished" arbitrarily severely. This limitation is a problem because of the requirement of perfection. Deviators must be punished, but it must also be in the interest of the punishers to punish. That is, they must themselves be threatened with punishment if they fail to punish a deviator. Such considerations give rise to an infinite sequence of potential punishments that, at each level, enforce the punishments of the previous level. Depending on how these punishments are arranged, they may have to become increasingly severe the farther out in the sequence they lie. This creates no problem in supergames but may be impossible for the two types of games that we consider. It seems natural, therefore, to study these two types together. Section 2 presents the classical Folk Theorem and the Aumann-Shapley/ Rubinstein and Friedman variants. Section 3 discusses continuity of the equilibrium correspondence as a function of the discount factor and develops Folk Theorems for infinitely repeated games with discounting. Section 4 provides a simple proof that any payoffs that Pareto dominate a (one-shot) Nash equilibrium can be sustained in an equilibrium of a finitely repeated game with incomplete information. This result is the analog of the Friedman [5] result. Section 5 uses a more complex approach to prove a Folk Theorem for these finitely repeated games. Sections 2-5 follow previous work on repeated games in assuming that, if mixed strategies are used as punishments, they are themselves observable. In Section 6 we drop this assumption but show that our results continue to hold under the more natural hypothesis that players can observe only each other's past actions.
THE CLASSICAL FOLK THEOREM
Consider a finite n-person game in normal form g: Al x ... x An --Rn For now, we shall not distinguish between pure and mixed strategies, and so we might as well suppose that the Ai's consist of mixed strategies. Thus, we are assuming either that a player can observe the others' past mixed strategies, as in previous work on repeated games, or restricting players to pure strategies. Mixed strategies can be made observable if the outcomes of players' randomizing devices are jointly observable ex-post. (More importantly, we show in Section 6 that the assumption is not necessary.) Moreover, for convenience, we assume that the players can make their actions contingent on the outcome of a public randomizing device. That is, they can play correlated strategies.6 Even if a correlated strategy over vectors of actions cannot literally be adopted, it can still be approximated if the action vectors are played successively over time and the frequency of any given vector corresponds to its probability in the correlated strategy. To see how to modify the statements of the theorems if correlated strategies cannot be used, see the Remark following Theorem A. . More generally, a correlated strategy might entail having each player make his action contingent on a (private) signal correlated with some randomizing device. We shall, however, ignore this possibility.
7The notation "a_j" denotes '"(a1,...,a a .1aj+. an)", and "gj(a3, M'j)" denotes gj(Mj,. .., Mj-l, aj, Mj+, *.*, Mj).
8Actually, if n : 3, the other players may be able to keep player j's payoff even lower by using a correlated strategy against j, where the outcome of the correlating device is not observed by j (another way of putting this is to observe that, for n > 3, the inequality maxa, mina, gj(aj, a-,) S minaj maxa, gj(aj, a-j) can hold strictly). In keeping with the rest of the literature on repeated games, however, we shall rule out such correlated strategies. REMARK: If we disallowed correlated strategies, the same proof would establish that any positive vector in U could be enforced as an equilibrium. For other points (v1,..., Vn) in V* the statement of the theorem must be modified to read: for all e > 0 there exists _ < 1 such that, for all 8 > §, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game in which each player i's average payoff is within e of vi, when players have discount factor 8. The e qualification is needed because discounting and the requirement that each vector of actions be played an integral number of times limit the accuracy of approximating a correlated strategy by switching among action vectors over time. The Aumann-Shapley and Rubinstein arguments assume that past mixed strategies are observable (or, alternatively, that only pure strategies are ever played, which, in general, implies a smaller equilibrium set). However, the methods of Section 6 can be used to establish Theorem B in the case where only past actions are observable.
The idea of the proof is simple to express. Once again, as long as everyone has previously conformed, players continue to play their si's, leading to payoff vi. If some player j deviates, he is, as before, minimaxed but, rather than forever, only long enough to wipe out any possible gain that he obtained from this deviation. After this punishment, the players go back to their si's. To induce the punishers to go through with their minimaxing, they are threatened with the prospect that, if any one of them deviates from his punishment strategy, he in turn will be minimaxed by the others long enough to make such a deviation not worthwhile. Moreover, his punishers will be punished if any one of them deviates, etc. Thus, there is a potential sequence of successively higher order punishments, where the punishment at each level is carried out for fear the punishment at the next level will be invoked.
Theorem B is not an exact counterpart of Theorem A because it allows no discounting at all (we investigate in Section 3 when an exact counterpart holds). Mioreover, the strategies of the proof are a good deal more complex than those of Theorem A. One well-known case that admits both discounting and simple strategies is where the point to be sustained Pareto dominates the payoffs of a Nash equilibrium of the constituent game g. PROOF: Suppose that players play actions that sustain (v1,..., vj) until someone deviates, after which they play (e1,. . ., en) forever. With sufficiently little discounting, this behavior constitutes a perfect equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Because the punishments used in Theorem C are less severe than those in Theorems A and B, its conclusion is correspondingly weaker. For example, Theorem C does not allow us to conclude that a Stackelberg outcome can be supported as an equilibrium in an infinitely-repeated quantity-setting duopoly.
THE FOLK THEOREM IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING
We now turn to the question of whether Theorem A holds for perfect rather than Nash equilibrium. Technically speaking, we are investigating the lower hemicontinuity12 of the perfect equilibrium average payoff correspondence (where the independent variable is the discount factor, 8) at 8 
3A. Two-Player Games
Our particular concern, however, is the issue of lower hemicontinuity at 8 = 1, and we begin with two-player games. It turns out that, in this case, the exact analog of Theorem A holds for perfect equilibrium. We should point out, however, 12 A correspondencef: X -e Y is lower hemicontinuous at x = x if for any y ef(x) and any sequence x e x there e'xists a sequence ym e y such that ym Gf(xm) for all m. 13 If Y is compact the correspondence f: X -e Y is upper hemicontinuous at x if for any sequence x e x and any sequence ym e -such that ym ef(xm) for all m, we have y 5f(x).
that to establish this analog we cannot use the Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein (AS/R) strategies of Theorem B once there is discounting. To see that, if there is discounting, such strategies may not be able to sustain all individually rational points, consider the following example. 
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That is, log(8 -1+ 8) But (4) is a more stringent requirement than (2), since 1 (2/(2 + ))1/ t > Continuing iteratively, we find that, for successively higher order punishments, 8 is bounded below by a sequence of numbers converging to 1. Since 8 is itself strictly less than 1, however, this is an impossibility, and so an AS/R equilibrium is impossible.
The problem is that in this example the punisher is hurt more severely by his punishment than is his victim. He must therefore be threatened with an even stronger punishment. Without discounting, this can be arranged by (roughly) taking the ti's to be a geometric series, as in Rubinstein [20] . With discounting, however, arbitrarily long punishments are not arbitrarily severe, because far-off punishments are relatively unimportant.
These punishment strategies are not "simple" in the sense of Abreu [1] because they are not independent of history, i.e., they depend on the previous sequence of deviations. Abreu's work shows that there is no loss in restricting attention to simple punishments when players discount the future. Indeed, we make use of simple punishments in the proof of the following result, which shows that we can do without arbitrarily severe punishments in the two-player case. The strategies in the proof of Theorem 1 are easily summarized. After a deviation by either player, each player minimaxes the other for a certain number of periods, after which they return to the original path. If a further deviation occurs during the punishment phase, the phase is begun again.
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 1 the only place where we invoked our assumption that past mixed strategies can be observed was in supposing that deviations from the minimax strategies, M1 and M2, can be detected. This assumption is dropped in Section 6.
3B. Three or More Players
The method we used to establish Theorem 1-"mutual minimaxing"-does not extend to three or more players. This is because with, say, three players there may exist no triple of alternatives (M1, M2, M3) such that M2 and M3 minimax player one, M1 and M3 minimax two, and M1 and M2 minimax three; that is, the "mutual minimax" property may fail. However, the situation is even worse: not only does the method of proving Theorem 1 fail to extend, but the result itself does not generalize. To see this, consider the following example. That is, /3 is the minimum that the most fortunate defector can obtain in an optimal (one-shot) deviation from an arbitrary configuration of strategies. We claim that /3 > 1/4. Hence, the mutual minimax property does not hold. To see this, let ai be the probability that player i plays the "first" pure strategy, i.e., the first column, row, or matrix as appropriate. 1-8 15 If several players deviate from (A) simultaneously, then we can just as well suppose that everyone ignores the deviation and continues to play s. 16 As in footnote 15, we can suppose that simultaneous deviation by several players is ignored. 
If he conforms throughout, he obtains vi/(l -8), so that the gain to deviating is

1-6 1-6
As 8->1, the second term in (11) remains finite because (1-8"+1)/(1-8) converges to v +1. But, because 8" converges to 1, the third converges to negative infinity. Thus there exists _i < 1 such that for all 8 > §i, player i will not deviate in phase (B) if the discount factor is 8.
Finally, the argument for why players do not deviate in phase (C) is practically the same as that for phase (A).
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION WITH NASH THREATS
Suppose that a game is repeated finitely many times, v, that players maximize the (expected) sum of their one-shot payoffs, and that players can observe all past one-shot strategies (including mixed strategies). This repeated game can be embedded in a v-period sequential game of incomplete information. Suppose that players' payoffs and, perhaps, even their action spaces Ai depend on their types (although we shall not explicitly consider this latter type of incomplete information). With probability, say, 1-E, a given player i is described by gi. We call a player of this type "sane" or "rational." However with probability e his payoffs and action spaces may be different and might even be period-dependent. Such a player we call "crazy." The motivation for suggesting this possibility is that often one cannot be sure what kind of player one is up against. One might be almost sure, but even if E is nearly zero, one may nevertheless wish to take into account other possibilities. Indeed, as the following result shows any vector of payoffs Pareto dominating a Nash equilibrium of the constituent game, g, can arise approximately17 as the average payoffs of a perfect equilibrium of a game of incomplete information18 that, with high probability is just a finitely repeated version of g. The result, therefore, is the counterpart for finitely repeated games of incomplete information of Friedman's Theorem C above. We will consider a sequential game where each player i can be of two types: "sane," in which case his payoffs are described by gi, and "crazy," in which case he plays si each period as long as s has always been played previously and otherwise plays ei. Players initially attach probability E to player i's being crazy and probability 1-E to i's being sane. We shall see that early enough in the game, both types of player i play si if there have been no deviations from s. Hence, a deviation from si constitutes an "impossible" event, one for which we cannot apply Bayes' rule, and so we must specify players' beliefs about i in such an event. We shall suppose that then all players attach probability one to player i's being sane. Now starting at any point of this sequential game where there has already been a deviation from s, it is clear that one sequential equilibrium of the continuation game consists of all players playing Nash strategies (the ei's) until the end of the game. We shall always select this equilibrium. '7The qualification "approximately" is necessary because the game is repeated only finitely more times. 18 Because the game is one of incomplete information, we must use some sort of Bayesian perfect equilibrium concept. We shall adopt the sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson [15] . According to this concept a player has probabilistic beliefs about other players' types that are updated in Bayesian fashion according to what other players do. An equilibrium is a configuration of strategies as functions of players' types such that, at every point of the game, each player's strategy is optimal for him, given others strategies and his beliefs about their types (actually the concept is a bit more refined than this, but, given the simple structure of our games, this description will do). 
From (12), (14) is bigger than (13)
. Hence all players i will play si in any period at least v periods from the end. Thus, for any E > 0, we can choose v big enough so that player i's average payoff of the v-period sequential game is within s of vi.
THE FOLK THEOREM IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section we strengthen the result of Section 4 by showing roughly that any individually rational point can be sustained (approximately) as the average equilibrium payoffs of a finitely repeated game if the number of repetitions is large enough. This assertion is not quite true for the same reason that the perfect equilibrium counterpart to Theorem A does not hold for three or more players: a discontinuity in V(8) can occur if the payoff set is degenerate. For this reason we confine attention to two-player games.19 THEOREM 4: For any (V1, V2) E V* and any E > 0 there exists v such that for any v > v there exists a v-period sequential game such that, with probability 1 -s, '9 If we posited full dimension we could also establish the result for three or more players; i.e., we could establish the analog of Theorem 3. player i is described in each period by gi and there exists a sequential equilibrium where player i's average payoff is within e of Vi.
The proof we provide in this section assumes the existence of a one-shot Nash equilibrium that yields both players strictly more than their minimax values. We have established the theorem in general using a similar but more complex argument that is presented in our 1985 working paper.
Briefly, the proof goes as follows: we know that with an infinite horizon our "mutual minimax" strategies of Theorem 1 will enforce any individually rational outcome. The problem with a finite horizon is to avoid the familiar "backwards unraveling" of these strategies from the end. To do so, we introduce the probability E that a player is "crazy" and will punish his opponent for deviations that would otherwise be too near the end to be deterred by credible (i.e., sequentially rational) threats. More specifically, we partition the game into three "phases." In the first phase, Phase I, players follow the strategies of Theorem 1. That is, they play strategies enforcing the desired outcome unless someone deviates, which triggers mutual minimaxing for ,3 periods, followed by a return to the original path. Deviations during the punishment period restart the mutual punishment. Phase II is a transitional phase. Punishments begun in Phase I are continued, if necessary, in Phase II, but deviations in Phase II are ignored until Phase III. In Phase III, a crazy type plays a Nash equilibrium strategy unless his opponent deviated in Phase II, in which case he plays his minimax strategy. Phase III is an "endgame" in which the crazy types create punishments that do not unravel, and Phase II simply connects this endgame to the strategies of Phase I. The proof shows that by making the last two phases long enough we indeed have an equilibrium, and, moreover, that the required lengths are independent of the total length of the game. Thus if the game lasts long enough, Phase I constitutes most of the game, and our result follows.20 PROOF: Let xi = gi(Ml, M2). Clearly xi < 0. Let (Yl, Y2) be the expected payoffs to a Nash equilibrium (el, e2) of the one-shot game g, and assume y, and Y2 are strictly positive.
As before, we suppose that players can use correlated mixed strategies. Let (Sl, s2) be correlated strategies yielding payoffs (vl, v2). Let 3 be an integer such that (15) p max (vii/vi), and, as before, let vi = minal,a2 g(al, a2). For given E > , choose an integer ai so that (16) ri3i + ai(1 -)yi < aiYi + vi + 3xi
and take a = max, ai. 20 We thank a referee for suggesting this simplified form of our earlier proof.
To describe the equilibrium play and the "crazy" player types, we partition the game into three "phases." We will number the periods so that the game ends in period 1. Phase I runs from period v to period a + 3 +1, Phase II from (a + 3) to a+ 1, and Phase III from a to 1.
We will specify crazy behavior recursively, that is, in each period we specify how the crazy player will behave if play to that point has corresponded to the "crazy" play specified for the previous periods, and also how the crazy player will respond to any deviation from that behavior.
Let us begin with Phase I. We define the index t (t) as follows. Set t (v) = v + 3. In period t, v -t > a + 3, the crazy type (of player i) plays si if It(t) -t /3, and M, otherwise. We set tI(t)= tI(t+ 1) if there was no deviation from "crazy" behavior in period t +1, and tF(t)= t otherwise. Thus the crazy type plays si until someone deviates. Deviations trigger 3 periods of minimaxing followed by a return to si if there have been no further deviations. Any deviation restarts the mutual punishment portion of the sequence, which runs for 3 periods after the deviation.
The crazy type follows the same strategy in Phase II as in Phase I, except that deviations in this phase do not change the index t(t). More specifically, in Next we describe the behavior of the "sane" types of each player. For a sequential equilibrium we must specify both a strategy for each player, mapping observations into actions, and a system of beliefs, mapping observations into inferences. In Phase I, each sane type's strategy is the same as the corresponding crazy strategy. If his opponent deviates from crazy behavior, the sane player's beliefs are unchanged-he continues to assign the ex ante probabilities of e and 1-E, respectively, to his opponent being crazy or sane.
In Phase II, if, in state 0 =0, a player deviates from crazy behavior, his opponent attaches probability one to his being crazy. The strategy of the sane type (of player i) in Phase II if 6 = 0 or j is to play as a crazy type. We do not the behavior in Phase II if = i or b is irrelevant for our analysis. We know there must exist an equilibrium for each such subgame,21 and, by deriving upper bounds on player i's payoffs there, we will show that these subgames are not reached on the equilibrium path. Thus, regardless of the form of this "endplay," there is a sequential equilibrium of the whole game in which sane types play as described in Phase I. The specified behavior and beliefs are summarized in Table I . Now we must show that the specified strategies form a Nash equilibrium in each subgame, and that the beliefs in each period are consistent with Bayes rule. We shall consider whether player one's specified behavior is optimal given his beliefs and player two's specified behavior.
We begin in Phase III. If 0 = 0 or 2, player one expects his opponent to play the Nash strategy e2 for the duration of the game (recall that if O = 2, player one believes player two is crazy), so that the best player one can do is to play his Nash strategy e1. Now consider some period t in Phase II, i.e., a + ,3 > t > a. First assume O = 0.
If player one conforms to his specified strategy in Phase II, his payoff each period is either vu (if T(t) -t 8) or xi (if T(t)-t<83).
Thus his lowest possible expected payoff for the remainder of Phase II is (t -a) First assume that t (t) <p + t, so that t is part of a "punishment sequence." If player one conforms in period t and subsequently, his payoff is when Bayes' rule is inapplicable. We should emphasize that our choice of conjectures was not arbitrary; the theorem is not true if, for example, a player believes his opponent to be sane with probability one after a deviation.
Kreps [12] , moreover, has pointed out that, because of our choice of conjectures, our equilibrium may not be stable in the sense of Kohlberg-Mertens [11] . 22 In response, we offer the following modified version of our construction. This version has no zero probability events, so that the issue of the "reasonableness" of the conjectures and the stability of the equilibrium do not arise. Specifically, assume that at each period in Phase II a crazy player plays as before with probability (1 -,u), while assigning strictly positive probability to every other pure strategy. If A is sufficiently near zero, the expected payoffs in every subgame are essentially unchanged, and our strategies are still in equilibrium. Given that the crazy player "trembles" with positive probability in Phase II, any deviation in that phase must reveal that the deviator is crazy, as we specified.
UNOBSERVABLE MIXED STRATEGIES
The arguments in Sections 2-5 rely on mixed strategies' being observable. Although this assumption is often used, at least implicitly, in the Folk Theorem literature and can be justified in some circumstances, the more natural hypothesis is that only the moves that players actually make are observed by their opponents. In this section we argue that our results continue to hold with unobservable mixed strategies.
We suggested earlier that the only significant use that our proofs make of the assumption that mixed strategies are observable is in supposing that minimax strategies are observable. The heart of the argument, in Theorem 5, therefore, is to show that it suffices for other players to observe the realization of a punisher's random mixed strategy.
Although we rule out observation of private mixed strategies, we continue to assume, for convenience, that strategies can depend on the outcome of publicly observed random variables. We also impose the nondegeneracy assumption of Theorem 2. 22 The intuitive basis for Krep's observation is that since the crazy types prefer crazy play, the sane types are "more likely" to deviate from it. Of course, in the games as specified this is not strictly true, but in the "perturbed" versions of the game considered when testing for stability, there would be some deviations that did not increase the opponents's belief that the deviator is crazy. gi(a (k), M ) -gi(a (1), MU ) . The strategies Ti are chosen so that player i will be indifferent among all the pure strategies in the support of MJ. The idea is that any expected advantage that player i obtains from using ai(k) rather than ai(i) in phase (B) is subsequently removed in phase (C). Player i then may as well randomize as prescribed by Mi. He will not deviate from the support of M\ since such a deviation will be detected and punished.
D. FUDENBERG AND E. MASKIN
We can also show that Theorem 1 continues to hold with unobservable mixed strategies; we omit the details, except to say that our proof relies on "rewarding" a player who uses a "costly" element of his minimax set with a (small) probability that play will switch from mutual minimaxing to a static Nash equilibrium. 
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